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REVIEW
Genomic insights into the emergence
and spread of antimicrobial-resistant
bacterial pathogens
Stephen Baker,1,2,3* Nicholas Thomson,4,5 François-Xavier Weill,6 Kathryn E. Holt5,7
Whole-genome sequencing (WGS) has been vital for revealing the rapid temporal and spatial
evolution of antimicrobial resistance (AMR) in bacterial pathogens. Some antimicrobial-
resistant pathogens have outpaced us, with untreatable infections appearing in hospitals and
the community. However,WGS has additionally provided us with enough knowledge to initiate
countermeasures. Although we cannot stop bacterial adaptation, the predictability of many
evolutionary processes in AMR bacteria offers us an opportunity to channel them using new
control strategies. Furthermore, by usingWGS for coordinating surveillance and to create amore
fundamental understanding of the outcome of antimicrobial treatment and AMRmechanisms,
we can use current and future antimicrobials more effectively and aim to extend their longevity.
W
hen antimicrobial drugs were intro-
duced into clinical usage in the mid-
20th century, they had an astonishing
impact on human health. Infectious
bacteria that had threatened our sur-
vival were now at the mercy of a chemical
arsenal. Previously fatal infections, from whoop-
ing cough and scarlet fever to tuberculosis and
syphilis, were no longer considered a threat.
Antimicrobials substantially reduced the risks
associated with child birth, injuries, and inva-
sive medical procedures. What has followed in
the subsequent 70 years or so has been an un-
controlled microbiological experiment conducted
on an unprecedented scale. Initially we identi-
fied a plethora of new antimicrobial classes tar-
geting different essential bacterial functions, but
we deployed them haphazardly in ever-increasing
quantities. Now antimicrobial resistance (AMR)
poses a genuine threat to human health, with the
potential to return us to a situation where com-
mon infections are as untreatable as they were in
the pre-antimicrobial era (1).
Humans did not create AMR; we simply pro-
moted it by applying evolutionary pressure.
Almost all antimicrobials have chemical sim-
ilarities with compounds that can be found
naturally; AMR genes have been found deep
in the permafrost (2) and arose long before
humankind’s ability to synthesize antibac-
terial chemicals and use them en masse. There-
fore, AMR in bacterial populations is a largely
predictable phenomenon; the more common-
ly a specific antimicrobial compound is used,
the more likely it is that resistance will emerge
and be maintained in an exposed microbial
population. The specific dynamics of the pro-
cesses associated with AMR are, however, less
predictable. The rapidity with which diverse
AMR phenotypes have emerged and become
established within human, animal, and wider
environmental populations of microbes has been
astonishing and most likely accelerated by con-
current advances in human development, mo-
bilization, and population growth.
The evolutionary dynamics of
antimicrobial resistance
How resistance is maintained and distributed
within bacterial populations is a function of
the organism’s lifestyle (i.e., transmission mode,
colonization, and pathogenicity) and the ge-
netic basis for resistance, which can be either
intrinsic (i.e., the organism naturally lacks the
specific pathway targeted by the drug), muta-
tion associated (i.e., induced changes are passed
vertically to descendants), or acquired via hor-
izontal gene transfer (HGT) between orga-
nisms (with acquired genes then being passed
vertically to progeny). The first reports of
penicillin-resistant infections occurred early
in the 1940s, but a penicillinase was described
even before the continued clinical usage of
the prototype antibiotic (3). Since then, there
have been numerous examples of the rapid
emergence of bacteria exhibiting resistance
to a specific antimicrobial class soon after its
introduction (4). However, in the past decade,
through the advent of high-throughput whole-
genome sequencing (WGS), we have been able
to make substantive advances in understanding
the dynamics of AMR evolution and spread in
bacterial populations.
WGS has become the key technology for un-
derstanding pathogen evolution, population
dynamics, and genomic epidemiology, as it
provides a far greater degree of reproducibil-
ity, standardization, and resolution than pre-
vious genotyping methods (5). By capturing
both the neutral evolution of the population—
for tracking transmission and diversification
of the organism—and the genetic determinants
of AMR, WGS can reveal detailed temporal
and spatial dynamics of AMR evolution and
simultaneously infer the impact of AMR se-
lection on pathogen populations. Much of the
pioneering WGS-based AMR work was focused
on the opportunistic Gram-positive human path-
ogen Staphylococcus aureus, particularly with
respect to the emergence of methicillin re-
sistance (MRSA) in health care facilities in
Europe (6). MRSA is still among the best exam-
ples of how AMR variants can rapidly emerge,
be efficiently maintained, and spread at dif-
ferent spatiotemporal scales, ranging from
individual hospital wards to health care net-
works, and internationally within human pop-
ulations (Fig. 1). MRSA was first observed in
1960, within a year of the introduction of second-
generation b-lactams, such as methicillin, into
clinical practice. However, phylogenetic recon-
struction showed that MRSA actually emerged
in the 1940s via HGT of the staphylococcal cas-
sette chromosome mec (SCCmec) element, as a
consequence of the initial mass usage of pen-
icillin (7). WGS data shows that MRSA has
arisen on numerous occasions independently in
different subpopulations on different conti-
nents (e.g., USA300, ST22 in Europe, and ST93
in Australia) through parallel HGT events and
spread throughout health care systems (6). The
history of health care–associated MRSA in the
later part of the 20th century was punctuated
by frequent epidemics associated with highly
successful clones, such as EMRSA-15 (ST22),
which was first described in the United Kingdom
in the 1990s and then spread throughout Europe,
and then intercontinentally (Fig. 1) (8). Notably,
a fluoroquinolone-resistant EMRSA-15 variant
arose in the United Kingdom soon after clinical
trials with ciprofloxacin in the 1980s, with point
mutations in the DNA gyrase and topoisomer-
ase IV genes. This critical event was the ap-
parent trigger for the subsequent pandemic
spread of a fluoroquinolone-resistant MRSA
variant (Fig. 1) (8).
The global dissemination of
antimicrobial-resistant clones
MRSA epitomizes a now all-too-familiar evolu-
tionary route by which successful AMR clones
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Fig. 1. The time line of the ST22 MRSA pandemic. Bayesian
phylogenetic tree reconstructing the ST22 MRSA pandemic over
a 30-year period (8). Maximum clade credibility tree of ST22 MRSA
based on BEAST analysis using a variable clock rate (uncorrelated
lognormal) model. Tips of the tree are constrained by isolation dates;
the time scale is shown at the base of the tree. Gains and losses
(D) of genetic determinants for resistance to methicillin (SCCmec),
fluoroquinolones (point mutations in grlA and gyrA), erythromycin
(plasmid-encoded ermC), and clindamycin (mutations in ermC
leader peptide region, c-ermC) have been mapped on the tree by
applying the parsimony criterion. The figure depicts two pivotal
events: the acquisition of methicillin resistance around 1977 and
fluoroquinolone resistance in 1982 (red arrows). This clone
then underwent rapid international spread, including country-
specific clonal expansions; countries highlighted in color.
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emerge in response to local antimicrobial usage,
undergo population expansion under selection
from sustained antimicrobial exposure, and
then explode into pandemic spread. The finer
details are organism specific and dependent
on their particular evolutionary landscape (e.g.,
mechanisms of resistance, fitness costs, modes
of transmission, and host range), but all follow
a similar basic trajectory, mirroring that ob-
served in the recent MEGA-plate experiment
(9). Briefly, exposure of susceptible bacteria to
antimicrobial drugs will result in the local emer-
gence of resistant mutants. This happens contin-
uously, as a genetically diverse pool of pathogens
are exposed to a range of different compounds
at different concentrations. Most resistant mu-
tants will be purged quickly from the popula-
tion, either through genetic drift or because
they are less fit for onward transmission. For
example, WGS data have shown that that a few
common resistance mutations emerge repeated-
ly in Mycobacterium tuberculosis during the
treatment of individuals but that these are rare-
ly transmitted (10). However, occasionally a re-
sistant mutant will have a sufficient fitness
advantage to undergo local clonal expansion in a
subset of infections. This occurs through a com-
bination of ongoing antimicrobial exposures
and/or a genetic background that moderates
the fitness cost, e.g., the compensatory muta-
tions in rifampicin-resistant M. tuberculosis
(11); the increased replication rate of Salmonella
Typhi with fluoroquinolone resistance–associated
DNA gyrase mutations (12); or chromosomal
variants that ameliorate the cost of AMR plas-
mid carriage (13). Once established, the locally
successful AMR clone may face opportunities for
further expansion, including potentially broader
geographical dissemination and/or spillover into
other host populations, depending on the mode
of transmission and the extent of antimicrobial
selection it encounters.
WGS investigations show that clonal ex-
pansion and ensuing geographical dissemina-
tion of pathogens can mostly be traced to the
acquisition of a specific AMR determinant(s)
like SCCmec in MRSA. This suggests the AMR
element(s) function as the “king maker” with-
in the various pathogen populations, determin-
ing which clones dominate locally, regionally,
and globally. Some mobile AMR genes have
played this role in multiple organisms and
clones; e.g., CTX-M-15 has driven the success of
Escherichia coli ST131 and several Klebsiella
pneumoniae clones (CG14/15, ST101) (14, 15).
Equally, AMR genes also benefit by association
with certain plasmid vectors or host bacte-
rial clones, which act as vehicles for dissemi-
nation. K. pneumoniae is host to several key
mobile AMR genes and has played a pivotal
role in the global dissemination of various ex-
tended spectrum b-lactamases (ESBLs) and
the carbapenemases KPC and NDM-1 (15). This
association may be linked to K. pneumoniae’s
broad ecological range and propensity for HGT,
which provide a conduit for AMR gene traf-
ficking from a very large gene pool into the
smaller subpopulations of human-associated
bacteria.
Another common reoccurring observation
is the accumulation of additional resistance
mechanisms in an already established AMR
clone, such as fluoroquinolone resistance in
EMRSA-15 (8). This phenomenon is likely driv-
en by escalating antimicrobial use to tackle
AMR infections, accompanied by a relaxation
of selective constraints and an increased ef-
fective population size of the successful clone.
It is particularly common in organisms that
can accumulate multiple AMR genes through
HGT, particularly within the Enterobacteriaceae
(14, 15), but is also evident in the highly clonal
and evolutionarily constrained M. tuberculosis,
in which resistance to isoniazid via a mutation
in katG commonly precedes further AMR mu-
tations (10).
Health care–associated “superbugs”
AMR organisms are highly destructive in hos-
pitals. Modern medicine relies on antimicrobial
therapy and prophylaxis to protect against op-
portunistic infections, which affect approxi-
mately 1 in 10 hospitalized patients globally. In
industrialized countries, health care–associated
infections account for the vast majority of the
communicable disease burden (16), but hos-
pitals on all continents are now plagued by
AMR infections. The combination of intensive
antimicrobial exposure in hosts whose immune
systems are struggling to defend against in-
fecting bacteria can rapidly select for resist-
ance. Several WGS studies have documented
local emergence of resistance in hospitalized
patients in response to specific antimicrobial
exposures, which have been studied in individ-
ual infections, treatment episodes (17), and
at the ward level (18). These studies show that
many of the same mutational events arise re-
peatedly in different patients and in different
host backgrounds, demonstrating that the
emergence of AMR in many organisms within
health care facilities is often predictable. Exam-
ples include the repeated acquisition of SCCmec
(methicillin resistance), walKR mutations (van-
comycin resistance) in S. aureus (18), and lpx
disruptions (colistin resistance) in Acinetobacter
baumannii (17).
Although AMR organisms arise continuously,
national- and international-level WGS snap-
shots show that most AMR infections are at-
tributable to a few clones within the broad
population of the specific pathogen. Thus, only
a small fraction of emergent AMR variants is
sufficiently fit for broader dissemination. WGS
investigations of Gram-negative opportunistic
pathogens mimic the pattern of MRSA, with
clonal spread that begins as localized expan-
sions, rapidly progressing to intercontinental
spread (within years) and even global dissem-
ination (within decades). Particularly concern-
ing is K. pneumoniae clone ST258, which carries
the plasmid-borne K. pneumoniae carbapene-
mase gene KPC that confers resistance to all
b-lactams, including carbapenems and cepha-
losporins (15). KPC ST258 arose in the United
States, where it began causing hospital out-
breaks around 2005. After first spreading to
Israel, by 2009, KPC ST258 was endemic in
Greece and Italy and has since spread across
Europe and South America and into Asia and
Australia (Fig. 2). The arrival of the clone in
new locations is linked to patients with a his-
tory of recent international travel to KPC
ST258–endemic areas. Other carbapenemase-
producing K. pneumoniae clones have also
emerged (e.g., OXA-48 ST405 in Spain and
KPC ST11 in China), but these have remained
relatively localized. Why a combination of the
KPC gene in the ST258 K. pneumoniae host
background has been so successful remains an
important unanswered question.
Other relevant Gram-negative health care–
associated AMR clones include the ESBL-producing
E. coli ST131, whose global dissemination has
been so rapid that its initial geographical ori-
gins were obscured (14). A. baumannii Global
Clone 1 (GC1) is probably the oldest multidrug-
resistant (MDR) hospital clone of A. baumannii
and emerged in the 1980s after acquisition of a
genomic island conferring resistance to all first-
line antimicrobials. GC1 latterly accumulated
resistance against fluoroquinolones and carba-
penems (19). The prevention and management
of infections with these highly resistant clones
is a major health care challenge, and alterna-
tive strategies, such as vaccines and targeted
immunotherapies, are urgently needed. However,
K. pneumoniae KPC ST258, E. coli ST131, and
A. baumannii GC1 all display extensive surface
antigen diversification, complicating such ap-
proaches (15, 19).
Antimicrobial resistance in
community-acquired infections
AMR is not only a substantial problem in health
care systems but is also prevalent among a wide
range of pathogens associated with community-
acquired infections. WGS studies show that
AMR in the community setting, as in hospi-
tals, is similarly dominated by a small num-
ber of globally disseminated clones that have
accumulated AMR determinants over time.
The waterborne enteric diseases typhoid fever
and dysentery provide two salient examples.
The vast majority of MDR typhoid fever cases
globally are caused by the Salmonella Typhi
H58 clone, which emerged in South Asia in the
early 1990s in association with an MDR plas-
mid and has since spread throughout Asia and
into East Africa, accumulating fluoroquinolone
resistance mutations in the genes encoding
DNA gyrase and topoisomerase IV (Fig. 2) (20).
Most pediatric cases of MDR shigellosis are
caused by a Shigella sonnei clone that carries a
mobile genetic element conferring resistance
to almost all first-line drugs on its chromosome.
The clone emerged in the 1970s and is now glob-
ally disseminated (Fig. 2) (21), with the same
fluoroquinolone resistance mutations as in
S. Typhi arising subsequently and spreading
out from South Asia (22).
Baker et al., Science 360, 733–738 (2017) 18 May 2018 3 of 6
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Sexually transmitted infections (STIs) pre-
sent particular complications for understand-
ing AMR in community-acquired disease, as
their transmission is driven by complex hu-
man behavior. AMR in STIs share the same
general evolutionary characteristics as AMR
in health care–acquired infections, but have
distinct transmission, diagnosis, and treat-
ment parameters that result in distinct spatio-
temporal dynamics. AMR in STIs are a major
concern; data from locations with good STI
surveillance systems suggest a general upward
trend in bacterial STI incidence dispropor-
tionately associated with specific communi-
ties (23). In 2014, men-who-have-sex-with-men
(MSM) represented <2% of the London adult
population; however, 28% of all new STIs were
diagnosed in this community. More specifically,
69% of all new cases of gonorrhea diagnosed
in London were in MSM, and the emergence of
some AMR variants of Neisseria gonorrhoeae
have been specifically linked to MSM commu-
nities (23). AMR in N. gonorrhoeae is such a
potential problem that it has been acknowl-
edged by the World Health Organization (WHO)
as being a major threat to human health (24).
MDR variants leave increasingly limited treat-
ment options, and there is a very real prospect
of widespread resistance to ceftriaxone, the
last remaining option for empirical monother-
apy. Indeed, there have already been isolated
reports of N. gonorrhoeae that exhibit resist-
ance to all current treatments (24). One of the
first epidemiological studies exploiting WGS
for N. gonorrhoeae aimed to understand how
particular AMR phenotypes had emerged. This
study showed that reduced susceptibility against
third-generation cephalosporins in the United
States between 2000 and 2014 was the conse-
quence of the expansion of two particular clones
arising within the MSM community that pos-
sessed the mosaic penA resistance allele (25).
For other STIs, the situation is less clear.
Despite reports of mutations in Chlamydia
trachomatis conferring in vitro resistance
against macrolides (the first-line treatment
for chlamydia), there is no evidence for the
stable maintenance of these mutations during
human infection (26). Similarly, intramuscular
injection with benzathine penicillin appears
to remain generally effective for treating syph-
ilis (Treponema pallidum). However, we are
missing key epidemiological information on
many STIs. In well-resourced clinical settings,
there is a move away from microbiological
culture as the “gold standard” for the diagno-
sis of bacterial STIs and increasing reliance on
molecular testing (24). Although molecular
tests have the advantage of being rapid and
sensitive, they have the disadvantage of being
destructive and do not screen for potential
AMR phenotypes (24). This situation is exa-
cerbated in resource-limited settings where
any form of diagnostic testing is rare, which
results in a substantial underreporting of STIs
and almost no AMR or pathogen prevalence
data (24).
Another issue complicating AMR detec-
tion in STIs is the challenge of individual case
management. A lack of diagnostic testing im-
poses a reliance on empirical syndromic ther-
apy, which can have undesired consequences
for driving the emergence of new AMR-STIs
because of undirected antibiotic treatment.
Shigella spp. are fecal-oral pathogens with a
notoriously low infectious dose and are adept
at acquiring new functions via HGT. Shigella
has emerged as an enteric STI with a capacity
for global dissemination of AMR genotypes.
Shigella outbreaks in MSM communities have
been sporadically observed since the 1970s (27).
An increase in MSM-associated dysentery has
been reported recently in the United Kingdom
with a Shigella flexneri resistant to azithro-
mycin in individuals with no history of travel
to countries with highly endemic Shigella (28).
Azithromycin is not routinely used to treat
dysentery in the United Kingdom, but is the
front-line treatment for gonococcal urethritis,
syphilis, and chlamydia. The emergence of this
S. flexneri variant was linked to the acquisi-
tion of a conjugative plasmid carrying various
macrolide resistance genes, which was likely
driven by azithromycin treatment for other
STIs. Transmission of organisms via oro-anal
sex, coupled with HIV-associated immunode-
ficiency, multiple sexual partners, and greater
Baker et al., Science 360, 733–738 (2017) 18 May 2018 4 of 6
Fig. 2. Origin and blast radius for the clonal expansion for three
multidrug-resistant Gram-negative bacteria clones. The map
summarizes data for the global dissemination of: dysentery causing
Shigella sonnei clone lineage III-global, with a chromosomal insertion
of a mobile genetic element encoding resistance to streptomycin,
trimethoprim-sulfamethoxazole, and tetracycline (red); the typhoid fever
pathogen Salmonella Typhi, clone H58, with a plasmid encoding resistance
to chloramphenicol, ampicillin, trimethoprim-sulfamethoxazole,
streptomycin, and tetracycline (blue); health care–associated Klebsiella
pneumoniae clone ST258, carrying the KPC carbapenemase encoding
resistance to all b-lactam antimicrobials, including carbapenems and
third-generation cephalosporins (gray).
“Sexually transmitted infections
present particular complications
for understanding AMR in
community-acquired disease,
as their transmission is driven
by complex human behavior.”
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exposure to STIs alongside therapeutic anti-
microbials, created the “perfect storm” for the
emergence of this specific MSM-associated AMR
lineage.
Foodborne dissemination of
antimicrobial resistance
Humans are exposed to animal sources of AMR
genes and bacteria through the food chain. The
need for a “one-health” (i.e., considering the
span of humans, animals, and their environ-
ment) strategy for AMR and infectious disease
for surveillance and containment across the
different sectors is well recognized. Nontyphoi-
dal Salmonella (NTS), which is among the most
common pathogens of humans and animals,
are key for understanding AMR dynamics from
a one-health perspective. In 2004, the Infec-
tious Disease Society of America (IDSA) issued
a report that presented a plausible catastrophic
scenario of a highly fatal epidemic of MDR-NTS,
illustrating how virulent AMR strains could
rapidly escalate into major foodborne outbreaks
threatening our food security. Indeed, large
foodborne NTS outbreaks have been observed
in recent decades, and NTS exhibiting resist-
ance to last-line antimicrobials are beginning
to be isolated.
The continued occurrence of MDR Salmonella
Typhimurium (one of the most common types
of NTS) as a cause of human infection per-
sonifies the one-health aspect of AMR and also
highlights repeating patterns of AMR evolu-
tion. Antimicrobials have been used to treat
and prevent infections in livestock since their
discovery but were also used as growth pro-
moters from the 1950s. In the early part of the
1960s, an increasing number of S. Typhimurium
with transferable MDR phenotypes began to
be isolated in the United Kingdom, with the
first outbreak of MDR S. Typhimurium (phage
type 27) in humans reported in 1959. This out-
break affected 102 patients; ~5% of isolates
were resistant to streptomycin, sulfonamides,
and tetracycline (29). In 1963, S. Typhimurium
phage typeDT29 emerged in theUnitedKingdom
following the adoption of intensive farming
methods using antibiotics for the rearing of
calves (30). Subsequently, in 1965, >1200 and
>500 MDR S. Typhimurium were isolated from
cattle and humans, respectively. A recent WGS
NTS investigation revealed that the AMR gene
cassettes present in these early U.K. Salmonella
outbreaks differed from those in historical Salmonella
outbreaks in France, despite geographic prox-
imity (31). This observation suggests that the
emergence of MDR S. Typhimurium was caused
by the independent acquisition of multiple AMR
determinants followed by country-specific clonal
expansions.
Observations from the 1960s were repeated
in the 1980s when S. Typhimurium phage type
DT104 with a genomic island encoding resistance
against ampicillin, chloramphenicol, streptomycin,
sulfonamides, and tetracyclines emerged in U.K.
cattle (32). This epidemic strain successively ac-
quired resistance to quinolones and trimetho-
prim. Over the coming years, DT104 became
widely distributed in cattle, poultry, pigs, and
sheep and in 1996, >4000 human infections
were associated withMDRDT104 in the United
Kingdom. MDR DT104 spread internationally
throughout the 1990s, particularly in conti-
nental Europe and North America, and became
established in multiple domestic animal pop-
ulations. By 2001, DT104 represented >50% of
all S. Typhimurium isolates in Eastern Europe
(33). Local and global transmission routes were
reconstructed by WGS, and the role of this
zoonotic pathogen in the spread of AMR through
interspecies transmission was elucidated (34).
These data may have cast doubt on the domi-
nance of local animals in spreading MDR DT104
to humans, but importantly, they highlighted
substantial gaps in our AMR surveillance. Nota-
bly, the general contribution of imported food
in spreading AMR bacteria to humans remains
poorly understood.
The latest foodborne S. Typhimurium epi-
demic was associated with swine and attrib-
uted to a monophasic variant (1,4,[5],12:i:-), which
emerged in Europe in themid-2000s, as highlighted
by spread of the clone in France from 2008 (Fig. 3)
(35). Sequence data identified these organisms
as one clone, despite belonging to multiple
phage types, that was distinct from monophasic
S. Typhimurium previously described in Spain
and North America. These were found to have
become MDR through the acquisition of a com-
posite transposon, which replaced the flagella
operon. These isolates had also acquired a ge-
nomic island, which encoded resistance to sev-
eral heavy metals in pig-feed supplements. This
European monophasic variant has now been
reported in swine in the Midwestern United
States, where it has become resistant to quino-
lones and third-generation cephalosporins (36).
It was proposed relatively early on that use
of penicillins and tetracyclines in livestock
was responsible for the emergence of MDR
S. Typhimurium. This hypothesis was contro-
versial, owing to the complexities of NTS epi-
demiology and the lack of molecular tools
allowing high-resolution tracking of the incrim-
inated bacteria in the different ecosystems.
In the 1980s, epidemiology, combined with early
molecular typing techniques, concluded that
most AMR variants of NTS in the United States
could be traced to animals (37). Antimicrobial
use for growth promotion was banned by the
European Union in 2006 and heavily regulated
in the United States in 2017. However, global-
ization of the food industry means that inap-
propriate antimicrobial use in one part of the
world has implications even for countries with
strong controls on their own usage. The recent
example of the worldwide dissemination of
MDR Salmonella Kentucky ST198 via African
poultry further highlights the requirement
for global one-health approaches to tackle
AMR (38).
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“…globalization of the food
industry means that
inappropriate antimicrobial
use in one part of the world
has implications even for
countries with strong
controls on their own usage.”
Fig. 3. The epidemic of monophasic Salmonella Typhimurium (1,4,[5],12:i:-). The graph shows
the number of Salmonella isolates from human infections at the French National Reference Centre
for Salmonella during 2000 to 2016. The blue bars depict the total number of Salmonella spp.
isolated by year over the defined period; the red plot depicts the number of Salmonella Typhimurium
(1,4,[5],12:i:-) isolated by year.
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Staying one step ahead
It is indisputable that efforts to kill bacteria
with chemicals will result in the selection,
propagation, and dissemination of resistant
variants. Data generated through WGS have
revealed the rapid pace at which the bacteria
can adapt to these chemicals. It is evident that
some AMR pathogens have outpaced us, with
untreatable infections appearing in hospitals
and the community; but WGS studies have
provided us with the tools and knowledge to
initiate an intelligence-driven fightback. In par-
ticular, population genomics data at various
spatiotemporal scales highlight many repeat-
ing patterns in the emergence and spread of
AMR. The predictability of these evolutionary
processes offers the opportunity to develop
strategies to minimize the chance that new
AMR clones are generated during individual
treatment that will spread locally. For example,
combination and sequential therapies may create
conditions that constrain the fitness of emerging
resistantmutants (39). These strategies are based
broadly on the principle that adaptation to
one class of antimicrobial drug may incur col-
lateral sensitivity to another, such that their
coordinated use imposes a roadblock to the
emergence and spread of resistance. As diagnos-
tics are generally lacking, the most practical
option is likely to be empirical antimicrobial
rotation as opposed to patient-tailored thera-
pies. In theory, antimicrobial combinations or
cycling can be employed at different levels (e.g.,
patients, wards, hospitals) and time scales (e.g.,
hours, days, months), depending on whether
the goal is to limit the emergence of AMRwithin
patients, or to confine the transmission of AMR
variants. However, much work is required to
determine the most effective way to restrict
emergence and spread of differing resistance
phenotypes in different settings (40). These ap-
proaches have the potential to lengthen the life
of current antimicrobials and are vital for sus-
taining the efficacy of new antimicrobials as
they are introduced.
A further important insight from WGS is
that while resistance arises constantly during
individual infections, most AMR variants re-
present a minimal risk with limited potential
for transmission beyond the index patient.
Hence, the major burden of AMR is associated
with a few high-risk clones that spread easily
and accumulate additional AMR phenotypes.
It is these clones that represent the greatest
risk beyond the individual patient and should
be targeted more aggressively for containment.
Work is still needed to understand the mech-
anisms underlying these apparently superfit
AMR clones, and WGS studies will be vital for
this process. Even in the absence of precise
mechanisms, WGS can be deployed immediately
for hospital infection control and public health
surveillance to identify and target clones with
epidemic potential as they arise.
The spatiotemporal dynamics of AMR evo-
lution revealed by WGS studies clearly illus-
trate that microbial populations do not respect
political boundaries; hence, it is imperative that
AMR genomic surveillance data are combined
internationally between different sectors in a
one-health approach (i.e., across medical, veter-
inary, agricultural, and environmental settings).
Such data sharing is essential to harness the
power of genomic surveillance to identify and
monitor evolutionary trends and population
dynamics and to identify superfit AMR clones
as they emerge and spread. The rapid pace of
the global spread of AMR organisms, such as
fluoroquinolone-resistant Shigella (22), indicates
that these efforts have to be implemented in
real time, as has been argued for the emergence
of novel pathogens (5). This is the vision of the
Global Microbial Identifier Project, the WHO,
and other international bodies, but it has yet to
gain international support from governments
and industries.
AMR is a truly global health problem, one
that we cannot ignore or attempt to counter
with increasingly powerful antimicrobial agents.
WGS has allowed us to understand the dynam-
ics of AMR and the chaos we have created
through haphazard antimicrobial usage. The
data are stark. However, recognizing the com-
plexity and assessing the magnitude of the task
ahead is the first fundamental step in tackling
the global AMR crisis. We are now at a pivotal
point, and what happens next is likely to dictate
the future of infectious disease control. Genomics
has outlined several repeating patterns in the
emergence and spread of AMR bacteria, and
although we cannot stop bacterial evolution, we
can try to channel it. Through coordinated ef-
forts, intelligent surveillance, and a more funda-
mental understanding of AMR mechanisms, we
can learn to use antimicrobials more effectively
and extend their longevity.
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